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Article 6

Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Prosecutions
A RETROSPECTIVE
Paul C. Giannelli†
The publication of the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) Report on forensic science, Strengthening Forensic
Science in the United States: A Path Forward,1 in February
2009 marked the culmination of thirty years of debate on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. In a sense, the NAS Report
told Congress to scrap the current structure and replace it with
a system that was independent of law enforcement and
premised on the research norms of science.2 The impetus for the
report can be traced to two events: The Supreme Court’s
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 an
opinion that revolutionized the legal test for the admissibility
of expert testimony, and DNA analysis, a technique that
†

Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University. Like most evidence teachers, I am deeply indebted
to Margaret Berger. I began teaching evidence in 1975, the year the Federal Rules of
Evidence became effective. In preparing for class, I relied on JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, which was the only complete text on
the Federal Rules at the time. In class, I used JACK B. WEINSTEIN, JOHN MANSFIELD,
MARGARET A. BERGER & NORMAN ABRAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, as my
casebook. See Paul C. Giannelli, Book Review: Cases and Materials on Evidence, 49
BROOK. L. REV. 629, 633-34 (1983) (“In summary, the seventh edition improves what
was already an exceptional book. The comprehensiveness of the text, achieved in part
through the use of copious notes, has been retained, and the organizational changes
will assist in the effective presentation of the course material.”).
1
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009). The National Research Council is an arm of the
National Academies.
2
See infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
3
509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court followed with General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to make
up what is now known as the Daubert trilogy; see also United States v. Alatorre, 222
F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Daubert has become ubiquitous in federal trial
courts.”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) (“In Daubert, the
Supreme Court radically changed the standard for admissibility of scientific
testimony.”); David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339,
340 (2002) (“Daubert initiated a scientific revolution in the law.”).
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revolutionized forensic science. Professor Margaret Berger
played a significant role in both these developments, as well as
in the NAS Report itself.
I.

THE DAUBERT TRILOGY

The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective in 1975.
At that time, the leading case on the admissibility of scientific
evidence was Frye v. United States,4 which held that the
admissibility of expert testimony depended on its “general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”5 In 1974,
the D.C. Circuit observed that Frye had “been followed
uniformly in this and other Circuits and there has never been
any successful challenge to it in any federal court.”6 Frye was
also the majority rule in the states.7 Yet, neither Frye nor the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence was addressed in the
legislative history of the Federal Rules. The issue was ignored
in the advisory committee’s notes,8 the congressional committee
reports,9 and the extensive hearings on the Federal Rules.10 The
year before the Supreme Court decided Daubert, Judge Becker
and Professor Orenstein referred to the Frye issue as the “most
controversial and important unresolved question in the Federal
Rules” of Evidence.11

4

293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See generally James E. Starrs, “A Still Life
Watercolor”: Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 684 (1982).
5
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
6
United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also
United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975) (The “federal courts
of appeals continue to subscribe to [the] ‘general scientific acceptability’ criterion.”).
7
See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general
acceptance’ in the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of the
courts in the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of
scientific evidence.”).
8
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183
(1973).
9
H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075; S. REP.
NO. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597 (1974)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098.
10
Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
(1973); Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. (1974).
11
Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After
Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, The Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 863 (1992).
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During this pre-Daubert era, textwriters12 and law
review commentators13 disagreed sharply about the continued
viability of the Frye test under the Federal Rules. Moreover, if
Frye was discarded, what would replace it? Arguing that the
Federal Rules’ failure to incorporate Frye indicated its
abandonment, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger proposed
an alternative approach specifying a number of factors for
determining the reliability of expert testimony: (1) the new
technique’s general acceptance in the field, (2) the expert’s
qualifications and stature, (3) the use that has been made of
the technique, (4) the potential rate of error, (5) the existence of
specialized literature, (6) the novelty of the new invention, and
(7) the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective
interpretation of the expert.14 At a conference devoted to this
issue, Professor Berger argued for this enhanced reliability
test,15 commenting that the “Frye test often seems to obscure
what the lawyers really should be asking. The question is not
always whether a procedure is scientifically valid, but whether
the procedure is being applied appropriately under the
circumstances in a particular case.”16 At another point, she
reported for a breakout group:
12

Compare MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.2,
at 655 (3d ed. 1991) (supporting Frye or a “substantial acceptance” test) and 1 DAVID
W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 105, at 818 (1977)
(“Probably the ‘general scientific acceptance’ approach has survived the enactment of
the Federal Rules . . . .”), with 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE
MANUAL ¶ 702[03] (1993) (Federal Rules’ failure to incorporate Frye indicates its
abandonment) and 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5169, at 92 (1978) (“Rule 401 repeals the Frye standard.”).
13
See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 595, 632 (1988) (criticizing Frye); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1197, 1207-08 (1980) (same); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New
Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879, 895-904 (1982) (discussing federal and
state courts that limited or rejected Frye).
14
3 WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at ¶ 702[03].
15
The National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists sponsored a conference
on the Frye test in the early 1980s. Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence,
99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). Subsequently, the ABA Section of Science and Technology
organized a symposium on the topic, including proposed amendments to Rule 702. See
Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 245 (1986); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed
Amendment to Federal Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 260 (1986); Frederic I. Lederer,
Resolving the Frye Dilemma—A Reliability Approach, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 240 (1986);
James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to
Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249 (1986);. Commentaries on
the various proposals were later discussed at the ABA’s annual conference in August
1986. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987).
16
99 F.R.D. at 222.
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No one in our group thought that the general acceptance test should
be retained, because no one could state specifically just what it
means. On the other hand, we do not think that all scientific
evidence should be admitted under a loosely structured relevance
standard. We agreed that the court should conduct some sort of
preliminary screening to ensure that a threshold of validity has been
met.17

The Supreme Court’s approach in Daubert echoed
Professor Berger’s position in several respects. First, the Court
jettisoned Frye as a matter of statutory interpretation. Second,
the Court required an independent judicial assessment of the
reliability of expert testimony. Third, the Court’s reliability test
rested on a multi-factor analysis, albeit with some factors that
differed from the Weinstein-Berger proposal.18 In the aftermath
of Daubert, many evidence scholars attempted to predict the
ramifications of the decision.19 Few were as perceptive as
Professor Berger, who wrote on the topic the year after Daubert
was decided.20 She made three observations about expert
testimony in criminal cases.
A.

Lack of Empirical Research

Her first point stressed the lack of empirical research:
“Considerable forensic evidence made its way into the
courtroom without empirical validation of the underlying
theory and/or its particular application. Courts never required
some of the most venerable branches of forensic science—such
as fingerprinting, ballistics, and handwriting—to demonstrate
their ability to make unique identifications.”21 A year later,
challenges to the admissibility of these forensic techniques
began. The first significant challenge under Daubert involved
handwriting and came in United States v. Starzecpyzel,22

17

Id. at 230.
In describing the trial judge’s screening or “gatekeeping function,” the
Court identified a number of factors: (1) testability, (2) peer review and publication, (3)
error rate, (4) maintenance of standards, and (5) general acceptance. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
19
See generally Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994).
20
Margaret A. Berger, Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test,
78 MINN. L. REV. 1345 (1994) [hereinafter Procedural Paradigms].
21
Id. at 1354.
22
880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See generally 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. 21 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the
scientific and legal issues associated with questioned document examinations).
18
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decided in 1995.23 Other handwriting cases followed, pointing
out the lack of empirical support underpinning the technique.24
Significantly, these cases viewed the Daubert trilogy as inviting
“reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’ venerable, technical
fields.”25
If Starzecpyzel unnerved document examiners, United
States v. Llera Plaza26 “sent shock waves through the
community of fingerprint analysts.”27 In that case, Judge Pollak
ruled that fingerprint experts would not be permitted to testify
that two sets of prints “matched”—that is, a positive
identification to the exclusion of all other persons. This was the
first time in nearly a hundred years that such a decision had
been rendered.28 On rehearing, however, Judge Pollak reversed
23

Handwriting was a prime target because a comprehensive article
questioning the underpinnings of the technique had been published in 1989. According
to the authors of that article:
Our literature search for empirical evaluation of handwriting identification
turned up one primitive and flawed validity study from nearly 50 years ago,
one 1973 paper that raises the issue of consistency among examiners but
presents only uncontrolled impressionistic and anecdotal information not
qualifying as data in any rigorous sense, and a summary of one study in a
1978 government report. Beyond this, nothing.
D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise”, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738
(1989).
24
See, e.g., United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (D. Ariz. 2002)
(“Because the principle of uniqueness is without empirical support, we conclude that a
document examiner will not be permitted to testify that the maker of a known
document is the maker of the questioned document. Nor will a document examiner be
able to testify as to identity in terms of probabilities.”); United States v. Lewis, 220 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 554 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (Expert’s “bald assertion that the ‘basic principle
of handwriting identification has been proven time and time again through research in
[his] field,’ without more specific substance, is inadequate to demonstrate testability
and error rate.”).
25
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999) (handwriting
comparison); see also Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 966 (same) (“Courts are now
confronting challenges to testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been
settled.”).
26
179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, mot. granted on recons., 188
F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See generally 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 22, at ch. 16 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with fingerprint
identification).
27
D.H. Kaye, The Nonscience of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza,
21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073, 1073 (2003).
28
The first reported fingerprint case was decided in 1911. See People v.
Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911). As Professor Mnookin has noted, however,
“fingerprints were accepted as an evidentiary tool without a great deal of scrutiny or
skepticism.” Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 13, 17 (2001). She elaborated: “Even if no two people had identical sets
of fingerprints, this did not establish that no two people could have a single identical
print, much less an identical part of a print. These are necessarily matters of
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himself,29 and later cases would continue to uphold the
admissibility of fingerprint evidence.30 Yet, the case had
captured the attention of the media, with news reports,31
mainstream publications,32 scientific journals,33 and television
shows giving it substantial coverage.34 Legal articles followed,35

probability, but neither the court in Jennings nor subsequent judges ever required that
fingerprint identification be placed on a secure statistical foundation.” Id. at 19.
29
188 F. Supp. 2d at 261. Llera Plaza II was not a total victory for the
prosecution. The rigor of proficiency testing was drawn into question because a
fingerprint examiner from New Scotland Yard testified that the FBI tests were
deficient: “It’s not testing their ability. It doesn’t test their expertise. I mean I’ve set
these tests to trainees and advanced technicians. And if I gave my experts these tests,
they’d fall about laughing.” Id. at 558. The district court agreed, noting that “the FBI
examiners got very high proficiency grades, but the tests they took did not. . . . [O]n the
present record I conclude that the proficiency tests are less demanding than they
should be.” Id. at 565; see also United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 274 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Proficiency testing is typically based on a study of prints that
are far superior to those usually retrieved from a crime scene.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Editorial, A Blow to the Credibility of Fingerprint Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 2,
2004, at A14 (“There are no systematic proficiency tests to evaluate examiners’ skill.
Those tests that exist are not routinely used and are substandard.”).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2004); Crisp,
324 F.3d at 268; United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003).
However, in State v. Rose, No. K06-545 (Md. Cir. Ct. Oct. 19, 2007), a trial judge
excluded fingerprint evidence. See James E. Starrs, Will Wonders Never Cease?
Fingerprinting Denied its Day in Maryland Trial Court, 31 SCIENTIFIC SLEUTHING REV.
1, 1 (2007) (discussing Rose).
31
E.g., Associated Press, Fingerprint Reliability Under Fire, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL, Feb. 25, 2002, at A3; Joann Loviglio, Trial Judge Reaffirms Fingerprint
Usability; Hearing Shows Him Science Involved, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar.
14, 2002, at A11; Andy Newman, Judge Who Ruled Out Matching Fingerprints
Changes his Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A27; Joseph A. Slobodzian, Court
Ruling Blurs the Future for Fingerprint Experts: Linking of Print to Person Not
Credible, Federal Judge Says, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 17, 2002, at A2; Richard
Willing, Judge Challenges Fingerprint Identification, USA TODAY, Jan 10, 2002, at A3.
32
E.g., Michael Specter, Do Fingerprints Lie? The Gold Standard of Forensic
Evidence is Now Being Challenged, 78 THE NEW YORKER 96 (May 27, 2002) (discussing
case including interview with judge).
33
See David L. Faigman, Is Science Different for Lawyers?, 297 SCIENCE 339,
339-40 (2002).
34
60 Minutes: Fingerprints (CBS television broadcast Jan. 5, 2003).
35
See Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility
Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189
(2004); Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science”
Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 (2002); Nathan Benedict, Note, Fingerprints and the
Daubert Standard for Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a
Proposed Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519 (2004); Tara Marie La Morte, Comment,
Sleeping Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic
Fingerprinting Evidence Under Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171 (2003); Kristin
Romandetti, Note, Recognizing and Responding to a Problem with the Admissibility of
Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 45 JURIMETRICS 41 (2004); Jessica M. Sombat,
Note, Latent Justice: Daubert’s Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification
Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819 (2002).

2010]

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

1143

with many commentators believing that Llera Plaza I was
more faithful to Daubert than Llera Plaza II.36
Once Daubert challenges on the admissibility of
handwriting and fingerprint evidence had been filed, it was
inevitable that firearms (ballistics) and tool mark
identifications would also be questioned.37 Although the initial
attacks failed,38 a pair of decisions by federal district courts in
Boston changed all this. The first case, United States v. Green,
was a frontal attack on the lack of empirical testing in this
field. The expert testified that a match could be made “to the
exclusion of every other firearm in the world.”39 That
conclusion, according to Judge Gertner, was “extraordinary,
particularly given [the expert’s] data and methods.”40
Consequently, the expert would only be permitted to explain
the ways in which the casings were similar, but not that they
came from a specific weapon “to the exclusion of every other

36

E.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN
SCI. & TECH. 47, 47 (2003) (“Judge Pollak’s first opinion [restricting latent fingerprint
individualization testimony] was the better one.”); Sombat, supra note 35, at 2825
(“[T]he result Judge Pollak reached when he excluded expert testimony concerning
fingerprints [in Llera Plaza I] was fair.”); Recent Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2349, 2352
(2002) (“Fingerprint expert testimony does not survive application of the Daubert
factors . . . .”).
37
Firearms identification (“ballistics”) developed in the early part of the last
century, and, by 1930, courts were admitting evidence based on the technique.
Subsequent cases have followed these precedents, admitting evidence of bullet,
cartridge case, and shot shell identifications. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 22, ch. 14 (discussing the scientific and legal issues associated with firearms and
tool mark identifications).
38
See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004) (ruling that
“the matching of spent shell casings to the weapon that fired them has been a
recognized method of ballistics testing in this circuit for decades”); United States v.
Foster, 300 F. Supp. 2d 375, 376 n.1 (D. Md. 2004) (“Ballistics evidence has been
accepted in criminal cases for many years. . . . In the years since Daubert, numerous
cases have confirmed the reliability of ballistics identification.”); United States v.
Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The Court has not found a single
case in this Circuit that would suggest that the entire field of ballistics identification is
unreliable.”); State v. Anderson, 624 S.E.2d 393, 398 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (no abuse of
discretion in admitting bullet identification evidence); Commonwealth v. Whitacre, 878
A.2d 96, 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to
permit admission of the evidence regarding comparison of the two shell casings with
the shotgun owned by Appellant”).
39
405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 (D. Mass. 2005).
40
Id. Although the expert had seven years of experience in the field, he was
not certified, and his lab was not accredited. Moreover, he had never been formally
tested by a neutral proficiency examination. Finally, he could not cite any reliable error
rates. The expert “conceded, over and over again, that he relied mainly on his
subjective judgment. There were no reference materials of any specificity, no national
or even local database on which he relied. And although he relied on his past
experience with these weapons, he had no notes or pictures memorializing his past.” Id.
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firearm in the world.”41 In the court’s view, that conclusion
“stretche[d] well beyond [the expert’s] data and methodology.”42
The court also issued a caution: “The more courts admit this
type of toolmark evidence without requiring documentation,
proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more sloppy
practices will endure; we should require more.”43
The second case, United States v. Monteiro,44 resulted in
a six-day evidentiary hearing. Although the court found that
“the
underlying
scientific
principle
behind
firearm
identification—that firearms transfer unique toolmarks to
spent cartridge cases—is valid under Daubert,”45 the expert in
that case had yet to satisfy the other Daubert factors.46
Moreover, the court described the traditional methodology as
essentially “tautological,” entrusting the critical decision to
“the minds eye of the examiner.”47
The next year, in United States v. Williams,48 the Second
Circuit upheld the admissibility of firearms identification
evidence, while noting that it did “not wish this opinion to be
taken as saying that any proffered ballistic expert should be
routinely admitted.”49 Moreover, the court observed that the
41

Id. at 109.
Id.
43
Id.
44
407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
45
Id. at 355.
46
Because the expert did not make any sketches or take any photographs,
adequate documentation was lacking: “Until the basis for the identification is described
in such a way that the procedure performed by Sgt. Weddleton is reproducible and
verifiable, it is inadmissible under Rule 702.” Id. at 374. Moreover, an independent
second examiner had not confirmed the identification, which was particularly
important because replacement parts had been used in the test-firing. Id.
47
The court wrote:
42

[T]he AFTE Theory, upon which the government relies, is tautological: it
requires each examiner to decide when there is “sufficient agreement” of
toolmarks to constitute an “identification.” . . . This threshold is surpassed
when the examiner finds that the agreement of toolmarks “exceeds the best
agreement demonstrated between toolmarks known to have been produced by
different tools and is consistent with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks
known to have been produced by the same tool.” . . . Toolmark analysis does
not follow an objective standard requiring, say, a certain percentage of marks
to match.
Id. at 370 (citations omitted) (citing Theory of Identification, Association of Firearm
and Toolmark Examiners, 30 AFTE J. 86 (1998)).
48
506 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2007).
49
Id. at 161; see also United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261
(M.D. Ga. 2007) (“According to his testimony, these toolmarks were sufficiently similar
to allow him to identify Defendant’s gun as the gun that fired the cartridge found at
the crime scene. He opined that he held this opinion to a 100% degree of certainty. . . .
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Daubert trilogy did not “‘grandfather’ or protect from Daubert
scrutiny evidence that had previously been admitted under
Frye.”50 Some trial courts continued to limit the scope of the
testimony, finding that the record did not support the
conclusion that identifications can be made to the exclusion of
all other firearms in the world.51 Another court ruled that the
expert would be permitted to testify only that it was “more
likely than not” that recovered bullets and cartridge cases came
from a particular weapon.52
Other techniques, such as bite mark comparison,53
microscopic hair examination,54 bullet lead analysis,55 and
intoxication testing,56 were also challenged. As Professor Berger
had noted, the lack of empirical research was the critical issue.
The Court also finds Tangren’s opinions reliable and based upon a scientifically valid
methodology. Evidence was presented at the hearing that the toolmark testing
methodology he employed has been tested, has been subjected to peer review, has an
ascertainable error rate, and is generally accepted in the scientific community.”);
Commonwealth v. Meeks, Nos. 2002-10961, 2003-10575, 2006 WL 2819423, at *50
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 28, 2006) (“The theory and process of firearms identification are
generally accepted and reliable, and the process has been reliably applied in these
cases. Accordingly, the firearms identification evidence, including opinions as to
matches, may be presented to the juries for their consideration, but only if that
evidence includes a detailed statement of the reasons for those opinions together with
appropriate documentation.”).
50
506 F.3d at 162.
51
See United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009);
United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167, 2007 WL 485967, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12,
2007).
52
United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 574-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see
also United States v. Mouzone, Criminal No. WDQ-08-086, slip op. at 57 (D. Md. Oct.
29, 2009) (magistrate recommendations).
53
See Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Analysis, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 930, 932
(2007) (discussing DNA exonerations in bitemark cases); Iain A. Pretty & David J.
Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses—A Critical Review, 41 SCI.
& JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in
European, Oceanic and North American Courts the fundamental scientific basis for
bitemark analysis has never been established.”).
54
See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1554 (E.D. Okla. 1995),
rev’d sub nom. on this issue, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997).
The district court had “been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that
expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert.” Id. at
1558. The court further observed: “Although the hair expert may have followed
procedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison
results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable.” Id.
55
In 2003, a federal district court excluded bullet lead evidence under the
Daubert standard, the first case to do so. United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137, 2003
WL 22922197, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2003); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC
ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 9 (2004) (identifying problems with
bullet lead analysis).
56
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002) (“Where,
as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court cannot disregard the challenge,
simply because a legion of earlier court decisions reached conclusions based on
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Background Rates

Professor Berger’s second point focused on the most
significant (and fundamental) problem underlying forensic
identification expert testimony—i.e., the inherent probabilistic
quality of these opinions. She wrote:
Prior to Daubert, courts admitted scientific evidence without noticing
that, in some instances, the probative value of the evidence depends
on background statistical information. If, for example, the samples of
tape to which a defendant had access at his place of work match
samples of tape used to manufacture a bomb sent through the mails
from an unknown location, the probative value of that evidence is
virtually non-existent if thousands of identical rolls of tape were
distributed throughout the world. The crucial scientific inquiry in
these cases is not only whether the technique is capable of producing
matches, but also the probability that other matches exist.
. . . We allow eyewitnesses to testify that the person fleeing the
scene wore a yellow jacket and permit proof that a defendant owned
a yellow jacket without establishing the background rate of yellow
jackets in the community. Jurors understand, however, that others
than the accused own yellow jackets. When experts testify about
samples matching in every respect, the jurors may be oblivious to
the probability concerns if no background rate is offered, or may be
unduly prejudiced or confused if the probability of a match is
confused with the probability of guilt, or if a background rate is
offered that does not have an adequate scientific foundation.57

In 2008, a year before the NAS Report on forensic
science was issued, a different NAS Report, one on
computerized ballistic imaging, echoed Professor Berger’s
point. This Report cautioned: “Conclusions drawn in firearms
identification should not be made to imply the presence of a
firm statistical basis when none has been demonstrated.”58 In
particular, the authors of the Report were concerned about
testimony cast “in bold absolutes” such as an assertion that a
match can be made to the exclusion of all other firearms in the
world. “Such comments cloak an inherently subjective
assessment of a match with an extreme probability statement

reference to the same then-unchallenged authority. . . . I cannot agree that [various
intoxication] tests, singly or in combination, have been shown to be as reliable as
asserted by Dr. Burns, the NHTSA publications, and the publications of the
communities of law enforcement officers and state prosecutors.”).
57
Procedural Paradigms, supra note 20, at 1356-57 (footnote omitted).
58
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 82 (2008).

2010]

SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

1147

that has no firm grounding and unrealistically implies an error
rate of zero.”59
C.

Error Rates

Professor Berger’s third point concerned one of the
Daubert Court’s reliability factors, i.e., error rates. She noted
that “[p]re-Daubert courts often ignored laboratory and
technician error rates resulting from the subjectivity involved
in interpreting particular forensic tests and overlooked the lack
of proper laboratory procedures that can produce other kinds of
errors.”60 As it turned out, in many post-Daubert cases,
fingerprint experts testified that the “error rate for the method
is zero.”61 Experts argued that, while individual examiners may
make mistakes, the method itself is perfect. However, in this
context the dichotomy between “methodological” and “human”
error rates is “practically meaningless”62 because the examiner
is the method and the examiner’s judgment is subjective.63
In sum, a year after Daubert was decided, Professor
Berger predicted the nature of the challenges that would be
mounted in the forensic identification cases, and more
importantly, identified the critical issues—opinion testimony
masking probabilistic assumptions and subjective judgments
without acknowledging error rates.

59

Id.
Procedural Paradigms, supra note 20, at 1358.
61
United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854 (S.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d,
260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001). But see United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 246 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“Testimony at the Daubert hearing indicated that some latent fingerprint
examiners insist that there is no error rate associated with their activities or that the
examination process is irreducibly subjective. This would be out-of-place under Rule
702.”).
62
See Mnookin, supra note 28, at 60. She goes on to provide this analogy:
“The same argument could be made of eyewitness testimony, a notoriously unreliable
form of evidence. People are all distinct from one another in observable ways; therefore
the theoretical error rate of eyewitness identification is zero, though in practice
observers may frequently make errors.” Id.
63
See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 172 (2005)
(“But, given its unavoidable subjective component, in latent print examination people
are the process.”). In 2005, Professor Cole published an article documenting twentythree cases of fingerprint misidentifications. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero:
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 985, 999 (2005). The misidentification cases include some that involved
(1) verification by one or more other examiners; (2) examiners certified by the
International Association of Identification; (3) procedures using a sixteen-point
standard; and (4) defense experts who corroborated misidentifications made by
prosecution experts. Id. at passim.
60
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DNA EVIDENCE

The advent of DNA profiling in 1985 produced a sea
change in forensic science.64 One court called DNA evidence the
“single greatest advance in the search for truth . . . since the
advent of cross-examination.”65 Even its early critics
acknowledged that “[a]ppropriately carried out and correctly
interpreted, DNA typing is possibly the most powerful
innovation in forensics since the development of fingerprinting
in the last part of the 19th Century.”66 No other technique had
been as complex or so subject to rapid change. New DNA
technologies were introduced at the trial level as cases
litigating the older procedures worked their way through the
appellate court system.67
Although the introduction of DNA evidence went
smoothly in the early going, a significant challenge to
admissibility was mounted in People v. Castro,68 a 1989 case.
64

In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England,
recognized the utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. Its first use in American
courts came the following year. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 8 (1990) [hereinafter
OTA REPORT]. The first appellate case, Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding DNA evidence admissible), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989),
was reported in 1988. By January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted into
evidence “in at least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA REPORT,
supra, at 14.
65
People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988). The popular
press trumpeted DNA evidence as “foolproof.” DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test,
TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66; see also Arastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A
New Forensic Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prosecutions, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74.
66
Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in Forensic
DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1746 (1991).
67
The initial technique, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP)
analysis by gel electrophoresis, was soon supplanted by Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR)-based methods involving the DQ-alpha locus, “polymarkers,” and the D1S80
locus. These, in turn, were replaced by Short Tandem Repeats, the current procedure.
In addition to nuclear DNA analysis, courts have admitted evidence based on
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) sequencing, as well as DNA analyses of animals, plants,
and the HIV virus. See United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2001) (in a
false statement prosecution, DNA used to compare swine blood); State v. Bogan, 905
P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (in murder case, DNA of seed pods from palo verde trees
at scene compared to those found in Bogan’s truck); State v. Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448
(La. Ct. App. 1997) (in a case of attempted murder by injection of HIV, expert testified
that the strands of HIV from two persons were “closely related”). But see State v.
Leuluaiaii, 77 P.3d 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (canine DNA match between sample
obtained from defendant and murder victim’s dog not generally accepted).
68
545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). In an unusual occurrence, the
prosecution and defense experts met without the attorneys and issued a joint
statement, including the following: “[T]he DNA data in this case are not scientifically
reliable enough to support the assertion that the samples . . . do or do not match. If
these data were submitted to a peer-reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, they
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The initial DNA skirmishes were over laboratory protocols, as
in Castro,69 but the controversy quickly metamorphosed into
fights over statistical interpretation and population genetics.
Population geneticists used statistical techniques to define the
extent to which a match of DNA markers individuated the
accused as the source of the crime scene sample and were able
to point to extensive empirical testing to support their
opinions.70 The validity of the statistical methods became the
focus of litigation.71
As the dispute heated, the FBI requested the National
Academy of Sciences to review the procedure. That
organization issued two reports on the subject, noting the
importance of certain practices: “No laboratory should let its
results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless
it has undergone . . . proficiency testing via blind trials.”72 The
first NAS Report on DNA, however, provoked its own
controversy and a second report was requested.73 The
controversy centered on a proposal (the ceiling principle)
offered to resolve the statistical issues surrounding DNA
testimony.74 Professor Berger served on the second NAS
Committee, and its report settled many of the controverted
issues—and, as she later noted, “DNA profiling . . . is
undoubtedly our ‘gold standard’ of expertise.”75
Professor Berger subsequently wrote on other DNA
issues. One article addressed the reporting of laboratory error

would not be accepted. Further experimentation would be required.” Eric S. Lander,
DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 504 (1989). See generally Jennifer L.
Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in
EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006).
69
See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to
Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735 (1994) (“The initial outcry over DNA typing standards
concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments
without controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of
autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical failings resulted in
any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to be a recipe for trouble.”
(footnote omitted)).
70
See, e.g., id. at 736.
71
United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 208 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom.,
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
72
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 55 (1992).
73
See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE
(1996).
74
See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY
IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 146 (2007).
75
Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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rates, an important but contentious issue.76 In another article,
she examined the impact of DNA exonerations on the criminal
justice system.77 In a book chapter, she considered DNA
profiling’s impact on finality principles.78
III.

NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT

As noted at the beginning of this essay, the National
Academy of Sciences issued its landmark report on forensic
science in the beginning of 2009.79 Implementation of its
recommendations would be the most important development in
forensic science since the establishment of the crime laboratory
in the mid-1920s. The issues are pressing. As the Report
recognized, “[a]mong existing forensic methods, only nuclear
DNA analysis has been rigorously shown to have the capacity
to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between an evidentiary sample and a
specific individual or source.”80 Professor Berger served on the
Committee that wrote the report.
The centerpiece of the report is a recommendation that
Congress establish an independent federal entity, the National
Institute of Forensic Sciences (NIFS), which would, among
other things, fund research “to address issues of accuracy,
reliability, and validity in the forensic science disciplines”81 and
establish and enforce “best practices” for forensic science
professionals and laboratories.82 Other recommendations
include (1) mandating laboratory accreditation and practitioner
certification,83 (2) removing crime laboratories from
administrative control of law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors’ offices,84 (3) supporting investigations into human
76

Margaret A. Berger, Laboratory Error Seen Through the Lens of Science
and Policy, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081 (1997).
77
Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal
Justice System, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 321 (2006) (noting that “statutes governing
post-conviction DNA procedures now exist in forty-one states, and bills are pending in
others”).
78
Margaret A. Berger, Lessons from DNA: Restriking the Balance between
Finality and Justice, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 109, 117 (David
Lazer ed., 2004).
79
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009).
80
Id. at 100.
81
Id. at 22-23 (Recommendation 3.).
82
Id. at 19 (Recommendation 1(a).).
83
Id. (Recommendation 1(b).).
84
Id. at 24 (Recommendation 4.).
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observer bias and sources of human error in forensic analysis,85
and (4) developing standard terminology and model laboratory
report formats.86
According to the Report, NIFS should also draft a code
of ethics for all forensic sciences and encourage individual
forensic societies to incorporate this national code as part of
their professional codes of conduct.87 In 1982, Professor Berger
raised this issue at a conference on scientific evidence: “Is
there, or should there be, a code of conduct for scientists that
would provide a basis for objecting to testimony that strayed
too far from strict impartiality?”88 At the same time, she
commented that “[t]he inequality of available resources
between the prosecution and the defense is alarming enough,
but it is compounded by the lack of scientific literacy on the
part of most defense lawyers.”89 Recommendation 10 of the NAS
Report provides, in part: “NIFS should also support law school
administrators and judicial education organizations in
establishing continuing legal education programs [on forensic
science] for law students, practitioners, and judges.”90
CONCLUSION
Professor Berger is one of the few scholars who is
equally comfortable examining expert testimony issues in both
civil and criminal cases.91 Her contribution to the development
85

Id. (Recommendation 5.).
Id. at 22 (Recommendation 2.).
87
Id. at 2 (Recommendation 9.). Moreover, the Report recommended the
creation of an enforcement mechanism for ethical violations through the certification
process.
88
Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 228
(1984).
89
Id. at 233.
90
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 79, at 27-28 (Recommendation 10.).
91
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse
Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 290 (2001) (“The Federal Judicial Center
conducted surveys in 1991 and 1998 asking federal judges and attorneys about expert
testimony. In the 1991 survey, seventy-five percent of the judges reported admitting all
proffered expert testimony. By 1998, only fifty-nine percent indicated that they
admitted all proffered expert testimony without limitation. Furthermore, sixty-five
percent of plaintiff and defendant counsel stated that judges are less likely to admit
some types of expert testimony since Daubert.”); Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating
General Causation: Notes Towards A New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135 (1997) (“All [the studies on specific toxic torts] report that
the corporation in question did not test its product adequately initially, failed to impart
information when potential problems emerged, and did not undertake further research
in response to adverse information. It appears that the corporations took virtually no
86
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of the law and society, through her scholarship and public
service on various NAS committees, has been exemplary. It is
only fitting that this essay should conclude with her words:
What criminal defendants need in order to deal more effectively with
the forensic identification expertise proffered against them is not
more Daubert, but tools that would enable them to make more
cogent evidentiary arguments—better counsel, access to expert
assistance and more discovery.92

steps to determine or minimize the possibility of harm until their hands were forced,
usually by litigation.”).
92
Berger, supra note 75, at 1140. She also wrote:
I strongly believe that we need a very stringent standard of proof in criminal
cases. I do not think, however, that Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. has been productive in effectuating this goal. In civil cases, courts engage
in rigorous gatekeeping and often exclude plaintiffs’ experts because the
theory underlying their testimony has not been adequately validated. But I
see no sign of a parallel approach in criminal cases even when there are
problems with the assumptions on which the prosecution’s expert testimony
rests.
Id. at 1125.

